Medium access control against insider denial-of-service
When multiple transmissions coexist and the channels overlap,
the transmission signals interfere with each other.
To reduce such interference and establish high-volume traffic links between hosts,
systems have been using medium access control (MAC) protocols to enable
the network users/antennas to coordinated with eac other before transmitting data.
Unfortunately, traditional MAC assumes user collaborations and does not work well
when misbehaving users compromised the network and deviates from the protocol,
in which case, the state-of-the-art is to disable MAC and choose the Nash equilibrium.
I investigate the security vulnerabilities against insider denial-of-service (DoS) attackers
and build resilient MAC designs that are effective even against such strong insider attackers.
Related publications at:
ToN 2015 (earlier version at MobiCom 2012),
CNS 2015